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JURISDICTION OF UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
Jurisdiction over this matter is conferred upon the Court of 
Appeals by Utah Cod& Annotated 78-2(a)~3(2)(g} (1989). As this 
is a district court case involving domestic relations;, 
specifically divorce or annulment. 
This appeal is from a final order of the Second Judicial 
District Court,, County of Weber, State of Utah? the Honorable 
Stanton M« Taylor made on the 25th day of September, 1990. 
i n 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
A. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT DECREE IS.VOID FOR LACK OF 
SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION. 
Standard of review: "An error is reversible if there is 
reasonable likelihood that a more favorable result would have 
been obtained by the complaining party in the absence of the 
error." Harris v Utah Transit Auth., 671 P.2d 217, 222 (Utah 
1983). 
Supporting authority: Proctor v Ins, Co„ of N. America, 
714 P.2d 1156, 1158 (Utah 1986); Sanders v Indus. Corom'n., 230 
P. 1026 (Utah 1924)5 Rice v State, 370 N.E.2d 902, 903 (Ind. 
1977); Persehe v Jones 387 N.W.2d 32,: 37 (S.D. 1986); Utah Code 
Ann.. 30-1-2(2) (1989). 
B. WHETHER THE • TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN 
AWARDING THE DECREE. 
Standard of review: Abuse of discretion. "This court 
will presume that the discretion of the trial court was properly 
exercised unless the record clearly shows the contrary." Donahue 
v Int. Health Care, Inc., 748 P.2d 1067, 68 (Utah 1987). 
Supporting authority: Donahue v Int. Health Care, Inc., 
748 P.2d 1067, 68 (Utah 1987); CJS Second, Appeal and Error, 
Section 1817, Page 156. 
iv 
DETERMATIVE STATUTES 
Utah Code Ann. 30-1-2(2) 1989). 
(2) When there is a husband or wife living, from whom the 
person marrying has not been divorced; 
Utah Code Ann. 30-1-17 (1989). 
When there is doubt as to the validity of a marriage? either 
party may, in a court of equity in a county where either party is 
domiciled, demand its avoidance or affirmance, but when one of 
the parties was under the age of consent at the time of the 
marriage,, the other party, being of proper age, shall have no 
such proceeding for that cause against the party under age- The 
judgement in the action shall either declare the marriage valid 
or annulled and shall be conclusive upon all persons concerned 
with the marriage. 
Utah Code Ann. 30-1-17 (1) (1989). 
If the parties have accumulated any property or acquired any 
obligations subsequent to the marriage, or there is genuine ms&d 
arising from economic change of circumstances due to the 
marriage, or if there ar& children born, or expected, the court 
may make temporary and final orders, and subsequently modify the 
orders, relating to the parties, their property and obligations, 
the children and their custody and visitation, and the support 
and maintenance of the parties and children, as may be equitable. 
v 
STATEMENT DF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE 
This case is an appeal from the District Court memorandum 
decision denying Plaintiff/Appellant's motion to set aside Decr&B 
of Divorce.. Plaintiff/Appel lant is the husband of a void 
marriage and seeks to have the Decree of Divorce set aside. 
B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION IN TRIAL COURT 
The husband, now the Appellant, filed a divorce Complain on 
May 17, 1988, Trial was heard before the Honorable Stanton M» 
Taylor, on the 9th day of November, 1989, The Decree of Divorce 
was singed December 20, 1989- A Motion to set aside Decree of 
Divorce was filed January 22, 1990- The trial court heard oral 
arguments on the Plaintiff's Motion 6n February 26, 1990, at 
10:30 a.m.. At that time the trial court asked that the parties 
brief the matter and that it be reheard- The parties briefed 
their positions and a hearing was held on May 14, 1990, at 11:00 
a.m.. The trial judge then entered his memorandum decision 
denying Plaintiff's Motion to Set Aside Decree of Divorce. 
C. RELEVANT FACTS 
The parties herein were married to each other on June 15, 
1984, in Teton County, State of Wyoming. (See Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law, signed December 20, 1989). Gaylene Van 
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D&r Stappen ("Appellee") had been previously been married to 
Richard Paul Opheikens- At the time the parties herein were 
married? Appellee was not yet divorced from Richard Paul 
Opheikens- (See Exhibit B attatcched to Affidavit of Plaintiff 
dated January 19, 1990). Wilbert Van Der STappen ("Appellant") 
was aware that Appellee's previous divorce had not been 
finalized. (See Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and 
DBCTBB of Divorce signed December 20, 19S9). After Appellee's 
previous marriage? was finally dissolved;, the parties continued 
to live together until sometime before the divorce action was 
filed. After the Decree of Divorce was entered5 Appellant, 
having been made aware of the impediment of the marriage, sought 
to have the Decree of Divorce set aside pursuant to Rule 60 of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure to have a Decree of Annulment 
entered. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Appellee does not dispute that the marriage to the Appellant 
in this case was not a valid marriage as recognized under current 
Utah Law- Nor does Appellee now dispute that a common law 
marriage between the parties did not exist due to the timing and 
requirements of the Utah State Law. 
What Appellee does dispute is Appellant's argument that the 
decree issued by the trial court herein is void as a matter of 
law. The trial court, based on the evidence pleadings and 
arguments before it made a finding that the Appellant was well 
aware of the defect in the Appellee's prior divorce. Therefore, 
having not raised the matter of lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction, the Appellant is not estopped from raising it at 
this time. The initial finder of fact did not abuse its 
discretion or in its Findings of Fact and its awards of support. 
This law is clear, that the trial court finder of fact is given 
wide discretion in its findings absent a clear abuse of that 
discretion. In conclusion, the BBcre& of Divorce, heretofore, 
entered in this matter and its awards therein is valid and was 
not an abuse of discretion on the trial courts part. 
ARGUMENT 
A. THE DECREE OF DIVORCE ENTERED BY DISTRICT COURT IS NOT 
VOID FOR LACK OF SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION 
The issue as to whether the decree entered by the trial 
court is void for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is more 
properly viewed in terms of whether the Appellant has waived his 
defense of lack of subject matter jurisdiction at the trial court 
level. Indicated in the trial court's findings, the Appellant 
was well aware of the impedient to the marriage to the Appellee 
and therefore, was aware of subject matter jurisdictional problem 
with the trial court issuing a Decree of Divorce as opposed to 
annulment-
Several cases exist where the Courts have held that a party 
in the position of the Appellant in the instant case has been 
estopped from setting aside that BBcrea of Divorce on the grounds 
of estoppel. 
In the case of Reinhart v Reinhart, S3 P.2d 62S (Kansas 
193S) the Court held that the husband was estopped from setting 
aside the Decree of Divorce the courts rational in this case, the 
wife petitioned the Court to set aside a Decree of Divorce on the 
grounds that the Court in that instant lacked subject matter 
jurisdiction\ the Court held that where she had received the 
benefits of the DfsczrBe of Divorce dissolving the bonds of 
matrimony, she could not later be permitted to repudiate the 
Court's jurisdiction. The Court? in citing earlier cases, stated 
that where the party in whose favor the DBCTBG had been granted 
could not later be allowed to vacate the Decree on the grounds of 
no subject matter jurisdiction. 
The facts in those cases ar& extremely similar to the case 
at hand. The plaintiff, knowing of the impedient to the marriage 
to the Appellee herein chose to file his Complaint for divorce 
only. The Decree entered herein was awarded in the Plaintiff's 
favor for the exact relief for which he prayed. 
In a practical indistinguishable case? the Utah Supreme 
Court ~ 4 ~ 
in the case of Caffal v Caffal 5 Utah 2d 407, 303 P.2d 386 
(1956), stated that where one had estopped the jurisdiction of a 
court for a divorce only, knowing that their exists a lack of 
subject matter jurisdiction, that party will later be allowed to 
vacate the Decree and deny its validity. 
In that case, the husband petitioned the Court to vacate 
the Decree of Divorce on the grounds, that since no legal marital 
status exist, the Court did not have subject matter jurisdiction. 
Although, the husband knew he was not legally able to marry, the 
parties proceeded with the second marriage anyway. Later, the 
husband failed to respond to the wife's petition for divorce 
only. The husband thereafter, allowed his default to be entered 
and the Decree was awarded to the wife. 
In affirming the trial courts dismissal of husbands' 
petition stated that "It is quite apparent in this case that 
(husband's) only reason for assailing the Decree of Divorce was 
to save himself from the obligation for support money provided 
for in the Decree", Caffal v Caffal, supra, at 287. 
In addition, the Court also stated that the husband also 
committed a fraud upon the Court where knowing his wife's 
allegations in her Complaint were untrue in that the marriage was 
void, the husband, in permitting his default to be entered, in 
the decree to issue without challenging the wife's allegation or 
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the subject matter jurisdiction. The singular difference between 
that case and the case at bar is that the fraud perpetrated by 
the Appellant herein, is perhaps irreprehensible. This is due to 
the fact that it is the Appellant who had initiated the lawsuit 
with untrue and perhaps fraudulent allegations in his Complaint. 
Appellant argues that Caffal v Caffal, supra is distinguishable 
in that the husband there did not know of the impudent to the 
second marriage. The finder of fact at the trial court level 
explicitly found the opposite to be true- Therefore, Caffal v 
Caffal, supra should be dispositive of the case at bar. 
B. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN ITS 
FINDINGS OR ITS ENTRY OF A DECREE OF DIVORCE HEREIN 
The standard in determining whether the trial court abused 
its discretion is that proper discretion will be presumed by a 
higher court unless the record clearly shows contrary. Donohue v 
Int. Health Care, Inc., 743 P.2d 1067, 68 (Utah 1987). Further, 
a "ruling,., will not be disturbed on appeal except when there is 
a clear and manifest abuse of discretion". Amoss v Bennion, 30 
Utah 2d 312, 517 P.2d 1003, (1973). 
The rational for this rule is based on sound judicial 
administration. The finder of fact at the trial court level is 
in the best position to observe the demeanor of the witnesses 
testifying and accordingly judge their relative credibility. The 
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testimony in this matter was heard by the trial court judge on 
November 9, 1989
 ? at the time of the actual divorce hearing. 
"In determining whether as a matter of law there is any 
evidence to sustain the judgment of the trial court, the higher 
court must assume that the evidence supports not only the express 
finding.»-but also any omitted findings which ar^ necessary to 
support the judgment and the higher court must view the evidence 
in the light most favorable to support the judgment and the 
findings of the trial court," CJS Second Appeal and Error, 
Section IS!?, Page 156. 
Appellant's reasons for appealing the trial courts decision 
a.re clearly set forth in the Brief for the Apellant (Page 15). 
Appellant, just as in Caffal v Caffal, supra, is attempting to 
avoid the obligation of alimony to the defendant herein. As a 
general rule alimony will not be awarded in an annulment. That 
is? howeverH "(i)n in the absence of statutory authority..." 4 
aj2d Annulment of Marriage, Section 102? Page 513. Section 30-1-
17.2 UCA? cleaxrly provides that authority to the trial court in 
the court's ability to make final orders in an annulment with 
regards to the support of the parties. 
CONCLUSION 
In the case before this Court, the marriage involved was 
clearly invalid under Utah State Law. It could not be 
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subsequently ratified nor can it be revived under the theory of 
common law marriage- However, the trial court did have 
jurisdiction to enter its order due to the failure of the 
Appellant to raise the issue of lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction„ Appellant should now be estopped to raise that 
issue» This Court should therefore? affirm the trial court's 
Findings and Decree entered thereon. Respectfully submitted this 
rx J day of February
 ? 199.1. 
Attorney for Appellee 
-8 -
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